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The public school is at once the symbol of our democ-
racy and the most pervasive means for promoting our
common destiny. In no activity of the [s]tate is it more
vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools.
- Felix Frankfurter'
INTRODUCTION
Despite decades of law and policy that demand otherwise, public
schools remain hotbeds of controversy on the question of how much re-
ligion in the classroom is too much. Charged with drawing and then
policing the fine line between church and state, schools struggle to set
policies that will satisfy parents, teachers, and courts. Restrictive rules
against religious instruction anger both a fiercely religious public trying
to control the curriculum and teachers who resent limits on their craft.
Lax policies encourage teachers to overstep settled boundaries, triggering
complaints from parents trying to protect their children from religious
t J.D., Cornell Law School, 2003; A.B., The College of William and Mary, 1999.
l Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (holding that
public schools cannot require religious education).
474 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12:473
indoctrination. Litigation naturally ensues, on two levels. First, when a
suit arises, courts must determine the contours of the church-state divi-
sion and decide whether a particular action by a school or teacher vio-
lates the Constitution. Second - and perhaps more important - courts
must determine how far litigation-wary schools can go in their attempts
to avoid violations in the first place.
As a recent Second Circuit decision reveals, though, answering only
the second question fails to solve the underlying problem. In 1999, the
Second Circuit decided Marchi v. Board of Cooperative Educational
Services,2 upholding a school's broad policy barring a teacher from mak-
ing religious references in class. The case sent the clear message that
schools may indeed go to great lengths to keep improper religious influ-
ences out of the classroom. On its face, the decision suggests that chil-
dren will receive strong protection from unconstitutional religious
instruction, but Marchi cannot operate in a vacuum. School policies are
only as strong as the law supporting them, and until that law of church
and state - the first question - becomes easier to navigate, controver-
sies, injuries, and litigation in schools will persist. 3
Marchi's legacy will remain a function of the constitutional tests for
when religious influence becomes improper, but those tests exist in a
state of flux, with a court's choice difficult to predict. Whether the cur-
rent Lemon4 test prevails or a successor emerges, the value to Marchi
will lie in the certainty and authority it carries. Marchi will realize its
potential as an Establishment Clause vanguard only after the Supreme
Court simplifies church-state jurisprudence and settles on an approach
that clearly and consistently protects religious freedom. In the absence
of certainty, schools may be unwilling to risk litigation, and Marchi's
promise will deteriorate into a course that follows majority opinions at
the cost of not protecting children.
Effective rules governing religion in the classroom will emerge only
after schools receive clearer guidance on the extent of their authority,
guidance that the current state of Establishment Clause law cannot pro-
vide. This note explores the need for a more certain statement or test of.
the Establishment Clause, from the perspective of Marchi's possible im-
pact on school policies. Part One introduces the courts' approaches to
the Establishment Clause as well as the context of schools' interests in
what happens in their classrooms. Part Two examines the Marchi deci-
2 Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. ["Marchi v. B.O.C.E.S."], 173 F.3d 469 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 869 (1999).
3 This note does not address the related, though distinct, issues involving student-initi-
ated religion, religious groups' right of access to school facilities, and evolution vs. creation-
ism in the curriculum. The narrow issue remains schools' rights regarding policies that govern
teachers' use of religion in the classroom.
4 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
2003] How SUPREME COURT UNCERTAINTY HINDERS SCHOOLS 475
sion and its potential to strengthen school policies. Part Three explores
the gap between current law and Marchi's potential, showing how a
more certain statement of the law would honor Marchi and provide fuller
Establishment Clause protection.5 The note concludes that Marchi repre-
sents an important first step but will travel only as far as the larger world
of constitutional law and policy allows.
I. THE SETTING
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Constitution requires that "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion." 6 Given the nation's strong religious
heritage, however, complete separation of church and state has never
been the aim.7 Even in public schools, the First Amendment imposes no
ban on religion in all forms. 8 Rather, the Establishment Clause9 prohib-
its only governmental "sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvement" in religious activity.l0
The starting point for evaluating the Establishment Clause remains
Lemon v. Kurtzman," decided by the Supreme Court in 1971. Lemon
articulated a three-part test that a state statute or activity must pass in
order to satisfy the Establishment Clause. The state action (1) must have
a secular purpose, (2) must have the primary effect of neither advancing
nor inhibiting religion, and (3) must not foster an excessive governmen-
5 However, this note does not attempt to advocate what an alternative Establishment
Clause approach should be or even whether a new approach is necessary. That question impli-
cates much broader constitutional issues and deserves far more comprehensive treatment than
this note can provide. I remain limited to the conclusion that coherent school policy requires a
more certain statement of the law, whatever that statement ultimately is.
6 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The prohibition is also binding on the states and their actors,
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (citing
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)). Justice Thomas has recently questioned
whether the Establishment Clause places the same restrictions on the states as it does on the
federal government. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). "When rights are incorporated against the [sltates," he wrote, "they should ad-
vance, not constrain, individual liberty" - a conclusion that would allow states "greater lati-
tude [than Congress] in dealing with matters of religion and education." Id. The notion of a
federal-state disparity on incorporated rights had been raised before. See Beauharnais v. Illi-
nois, 343 U.S. 250, 294 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
503-04 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
7 See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973)
("this [n]ation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between [c]hurch and
[s]tate").
8 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000).
9 The Establishment Clause is only that part of the First Amendment prohibiting the
establishment of religion. It is distinct from the Free Exercise Clause (as well as from the
protections of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition), which guarantees additional
rights beyond the scope of this note.
1o Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
'1 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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tal entanglement with religion. 12 An action that fails any of the prongs is
unconstitutional. 13 However, as Part Three details, courts attempting to
apply Lemon have generated refinements, shifts in emphasis, and much
confusion. Nonetheless, the case remains in force as the Supreme
Court's test for state-sponsored religion, and it continues to provide the
initial framework for Establishment Clause analysis. 14
Lemon is significant for setting the minimum requirements school
for policies that attempt to keep impermissible religion out of the class-
room. Whatever policy or action the school takes, it must, at least, sat-
isfy Lemon's standard against state-sponsored religion.' 5 Certainly, a
state must not allow its teachers to take actions that violate a Lemon
prong. From this starting point, a key question arises: How far may a
school go to avoid such violations in the first place?
B. POLICYMAKING IN THE SCHOOLS
Schools enjoy broad authority to prescribe, proscribe, and otherwise
control what their teachers say in the classroom. School officials may
exert this control over both the school's official curriculum and a
teacher's unsanctioned statements. Most simply, any in-class speech by
a public school teacher "is unquestionably an exercise of state power."16
The state certainly has the power to set its curriculum, 17 and even when a
teacher departs from the approved curriculum, her words carry the
weight of the state and may be regulated as such.' 8 This state action
clearly implicates Lemon and its progeny, with the consistent result that
the government may not sponsor, support, or actively involve itself in
religious activity. 19 State liability is potentially quite broad, and thus the
state has a clear interest in setting policies that keep teachers on the safe
side of the line.
12 Id. at 612-13.
13 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987).
14 Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 275 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Lemon ... while criticized
over the years, remains binding precedent").
15 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (1971).
16 W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish out of
Water, 77 NEB. L. REV. 301, 332 (1998).
17 See, e.g., Hennessy v. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 244 n.l (1st Cir. 1999) ("The
public school curriculum ... lies well within the province of state regulation."); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("By and large, public education in our [n]ation is commit-
ted to the control of state and local authorities.").
18 Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993) ("a teacher's classroom speech is
part of the curriculum"); see also Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 776-77 (10th Cir.
1991) ("a teacher's expression in the 'traditional classroom setting' also bears the imprimatur
of the school") (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)).
19 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (1971).
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Of course, teachers - like students - do not shed their constitu-
tional rights at the schoolhouse gate,20 although they do not enjoy a
meaningful right to academic freedom. Rather, the school's right to set
its curriculum "implies a corresponding right to require teachers to act
accordingly." 2' When a conflict with children's rights arises, it is the
teachers whose rights must yield: School policies may "adjust those
[teachers'] rights to the needs of the school environment. '22 Therefore,
the school's interest in not violating the Establishment Clause overrides
any free-speech rights a teacher might claim.23
Yet while courts, including the Supreme Court, have been reluctant
to interfere with curriculum decisions,24 they have recognized the Estab-
lishment Clause as a limit on that deference.25 Indeed, the Establishment
Clause itself may set the only bounds on the state's power to shape a
curriculum. 2 6 Lemon dictates these limits: If students mistake the
teacher's medium for a religious message - a "substantial" likelihood
even with high-school students2 7 - then the school ends up "endorsing"
religion, a clearly unconstitutional result.28 Therefore, schools have not
only a right but also an affirmative duty to set curricula and to develop
policies that keep those curricula within the bounds of the Establishment
Clause.
Schools act toward their students in a context different from other
government interactions with citizens, and those differences underlie a
school's leeway for regulating speech in the classroom. Most obviously,
public school students are a captive audience. A teacher's audience is
"decisively different from a street corner soapbox."'29 Rules for expan-
sive public-forum freedom of speech simply do not apply to the public
20 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
21 Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1992); see also,
e.g., Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc);
Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1989); Cary v. Bd. of
Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 544 (10th Cir. 1979).
22 Romano v. Harrington, 664 F. Supp. 675, 678 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
23 Thomas E. Wheeler II, Religious Expression by Teachers: Whose Classroom Is It?,
118 EDuc. L. REP. 571, 589 (1997).
24 See Gregory A. Clarick, Public School Teachers and the First Amendment: Protecting
the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693, 697-98 (1990).
25 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593-94 (1987) (citing Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 42 (1980)).
26 Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing
Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1080 (6th Cir. 1987) (Boggs, J.,
concurring)).
27 Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994).
28 Wheeler, supra note 23, at 587.
29 Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1991).
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school teacher.30 Similarly, courts do not follow the analysis used in
other situations in which the state attempts to regulate its employees'
speech. 3t Rather, the state's "peculiar responsibilities" in education dic-
tate an approach heavily weighted in favor of protecting children.32
A highly significant basis of schools' authority in this sui generis
context is the special susceptibility to religious endorsement that courts
attribute to children. As the Supreme Court has stated, "there are height-
ened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coer-
cive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools. '33 This
choice reflects more than a judicial determination that children deserve
additional protection. Legal observers, donning the mantle of social
scientists, speak authoritatively of the impact of formal education on
children's development. For example, "The authority to conduct and
control childhood education thus carries with it the ability to determine
what conception of the good life shall dominate children's formative
years."' 34 This leads naturally to the conclusion that "in many ways pub-
lic schools are an indoctrinator's dream. '35 Courts thus have no doubt
that the stakes are high.
Working from this point, courts have paid close attention to and
provided "scrupulous protection" to claims that implicate religious in-
struction in public schools. 36 Expressed bases for this protection include
students' possible reliance on teachers as role models, 37 involuntary pres-
ence, 38 impressionability, 39 inability to distinguish between teachers and
30 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267, 270 (1988) (noting that
schools do not share the traditional attributes of public forums).
31 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
32 Miles, 944 F.2d at 777 (applying the standard from Hazelwood that requires actions
merely to be reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical interest, 484 U.S. at 273).
33 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
34 Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 937, 947 (1996).
35 Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of Virtue, 69 ST.
JOHN's L. REV. 421, 425 n.25 (1995).
36 Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 378-79 (6th Cir. 1999).
37 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
38 Cf id. at 584 n.5 (noting that there is far less concern for undue influence at the
college level, where students voluntarily choose their courses).
39 Id.; see also Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985).
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preachers, 40 peer pressure,41 and limited experience. 42 These rationales
carry the greatest weight in the elementary school context. As the Court
observed, "The symbolism of a union between church and state is most
likely to influence children of tender years, whose experience is limited
and whose beliefs consequently are the function of environment as much
as of free and voluntary choice. '43 Accordingly, courts view the age of
the children at risk as "an important factor" in Lemon analysis. 44 Against
this backdrop, the Second Circuit set down its clearest signal that
schools' permissive powers are strong indeed.45
II. THE POTENTIAL
A. MARCHI v. B.O.C.E.S.
Dan Marchi was a high-school special education teacher in upstate
New York. A dozen years into his career, he "underwent a dramatic
conversion to Christianity" and began incorporating his new religious
beliefs into his instruction. 46 In 1991, he "shared this experience with his
students" and "modified his instructional program to discuss topics such
as forgiveness, reconciliation, and God."'47 The special education pro-
gram's director met with Marchi in the fall of 1994 and sent him a cease-
and-desist letter, prohibiting "any references to religion" in class, includ-
ing Marchi's "personal beliefs about the role of religion in our society
and its value to families. '48 Yet Marchi defied the order and refused to
change his classes.49 In the spring of 1995, the school association 50 sus-
pended Marchi for insubordination and conduct unbecoming a teacher,
40 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584.
41 Id.; see also Jabr v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd. ex rel. Metoyer, 171 F. Supp. 2d 653, 662
(W.D. La. 2001) ("We reject the School Board's argument that a ten[-] or eleven-year-old
fifth-grade student has the discretion to resist ... in front of the student's peers."). But note
that four Supreme Court justices believed that high-school students likely were capable of
distinguishing between government and private endorsement of religion. See Bd. of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250-51 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Lemon, however, the
majority addressed special protection the same for high schoolers as for elementary-school
students. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 passim (1971). In higher education, the
distinctions are great enough to "warrant[ ] a difference in constitutional results." Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
42 Ball, 473 U.S. at 390.
43 Id.
44 Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 239 (6th Cir. 1997).
45 The theme throughout this note is schools' power. I use the term "school" broadly to
include whatever actor - school official, school board, board of education, state agency -
exercises authority over public education in a particular situation.
46 Marchi v. B.O.C.E.S., 173 F.3d 469, 472 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 869 (1999).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 472-73.
50 The Board of Cooperative Educational Services (B.O.C.E.S.) is a regional cooperative
association of school districts that administers special education programs. Id. at 472. In the
480 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12:473
and a hearing officer later affirmed those charges and imposed a six-
month suspension.5'
In 1996, Marchi returned to work, pledging to follow the school's
directive.5 2 Instead, "shortly after" he returned, Marchi sent a letter to
one parent that read: "Ryan had a good day today. I thank you and the
[lord] for the tape[;] it brings the Spirit of Peace to the classroom....
May God Bless you all richly!" 53 Marchi argued that because the com-
munication was with a parent, not a student, he believed it to be outside
the scope of the school's order.54 His supervisor disagreed and ordered
Marchi not to give religious messages again, although he did not punish
Marchi. 55 That summer, Marchi sued the school association for alleged
civil rights violations, including the claim that the school's directive to
keep religion out of the classroom was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. 56
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York first
denied Marchi's motion to enjoin the school from enforcing its direc-
tive.57 Judge Frederick J. Scullin Jr. then granted the school's motion for
summary judgment, and Marchi appealed, insisting that the prohibition
on "any references to religion" was vague and overbroad. 58 The Second
Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, considering the directive both as
applied and on its face. 59 Writing for the unanimous panel, Senior Judge
Jon 0. Newman affirmed the district court and held the directive a con-
stitutional exercise of the school's authority.60
The court focused its analysis on the Lemon test, which it acknowl-
edged "has been criticized... [but] has not been overruled."'61 However,
the court noted that the Supreme Court "appears to have modified the
context of school-teacher-student relations, the board functions as the school entity - it is the
relevant state actor - and I refer to it as such.
51 Id. at 473.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 473-74. Marchi sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that (1) B.O.C.E.S.
violated his rights to academic freedom, free association, and free speech, as well as his rights
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; (2) B.O.C.E.S. denied him due process and
retaliated against him upon his return to teaching; (3) the directive was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad; and (4) the directive had been applied to protected speech with a parent.
Id. (The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488,
was subsequently declared unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
57 Marchi, 173 F.3d at 473-74.
58 Id. While Marchi initially alleged several civil rights claims, he appealed only the
dismissal of the claim that the school's directive was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
Id.
59 Id. at 474-75.
60 Id. at 475-81.
61 Id. at 475. See supra Part L.A for a discussion of Lemon.
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test" to emphasize whether the state action can be reasonably viewed as
endorsing religion. 62 In addition, Newman drew on several other princi-
ples that have emerged from Establishment Clause analyses: (a) that the
state may have a compelling interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause
violation; 63 (b) that schools have the authority and the constitutional duty
to ensure that their teachers do not inculcate religion;64 and (c) that a
government employer must be given leeway - "breathing space" - in
its regulation of religious speech.65 This aggregation of concerns, rather
than merely the test from Lemon, formed the framework for considering
Marchi's appeal.66
The Second Circuit held the school's directive to be valid both as
applied and on its face. As applied, the key factor was B.O.C.E.S.'s
"strong, perhaps compelling, interest in avoiding Establishment Clause
violations. '67 Any action by a teacher that "giv[es] the impression that
the school endorses religion" places the school at risk, and the school
may guard against such action.68 While this element weighed heavily in
the school's favor, the court acknowledged that Marchi's action was only
"slight in its references to religion. ' 69 However, public elementary and
secondary education adds the element of children. Children are deemed
particularly susceptible to religious indoctrination, and thus the state has
the added responsibility to prevent such instruction.7" While the danger
is greatest with younger children, even "[t]he likelihood of high school
students equating [the teacher's] views with those of the school is sub-
stantial. '71 As a result, the school's interest in avoiding a violation pre-
vailed: The directive was valid so long as "school authorities could
reasonably be concerned that [the teacher's action] would expose it to
non-frivolous Establishment Clause challenges. '72 This conclusion
shows one dimension of the school's scope of authority to create religion
policies: Classroom action may be barred as soon as it could give rise to
a parent's colorable lawsuit.
62 Marchi, 173 F.3d at 475 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).
63 Id. (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394
(1993)).
64 Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
65 Id. at 476.
66 Id. at 475-76.
67 Id. at 477 (citing Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994) (remarking
also that a teacher "is not just any ordinary citizen. He is a teacher... clothed with the mantle
of one who imparts knowledge and wisdom.").
71 Id.
72 Marchi, 173 F.3d at 477.
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The prohibition against "using any reference to religion" in the
classroom was also upheld as facially valid. 73 Due process requires that
a statute cannot be so vague that "people of common intelligence must
guess at its meaning."' 74 In this case, the policy's "references to religion"
language was "as clear as the context permits" and sufficient to give a
teacher fair notice of what was prohibited. 75 The court continued:
Aware that precise delineation of sanctionable conduct is
close to impossible, courts have granted schools, acting
in their capacity as employers, significant leeway ...
[T]he relevant inquiry is whether, "based on existing
regulations, policies, discussions, and other forms of
communication between school administrators and
teachers," it was "reasonable for the school to expect the
teacher to know that her conduct was prohibited. 76
This analysis reveals the second dimension of the school's author-
ity: A school need not articulate in advance "every imaginable situation
that might fall within" its regulation. 77
At the heart of this outcome lie the court's theoretical foundations: a
compelling state interest, the special susceptibility of children in public
schools, and the Lemon test of the Establishment Clause's lower limits.
The Marchi court thus brought forward its twofold principle to form the
most comprehensive statement to date of schools' policymaking power
to prevent Establishment Clause violations: Fear of a lawsuit is sufficient
justification for a policy, and that policy may be overbroad and less than
precise in its prohibitions.
B. MARCHI'S POTENTIAL
From that starting point, Marchi offers a potent defense of Estab-
lishment Clause values. Schools that assert their privilege to enact strong
policies for avoiding in-class indoctrination or to make strong responses
to individualized situations may do so knowing that these efforts will
find support in the courts. If teachers or parents who want more religion
(or less restriction) in the classroom mount a challenge, the school can
stand firm on Marchi and know that the balance of interests likely
weighs in its favor. Marchi offers a straightforward framework that
removes much uncertainty from the issue. A school confronted with a
possible Establishment Clause challenge can easily plug its specifics into
73 Id.
74 Id. at 480 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
75 Id.
76 Id. (quoting Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (Ist Cir. 1993)).
77 Id.
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the generous Marchi formulation: Is the challenge non-frivolous? If so,
the school can ban seemingly slight religious intrusions, even if the pol-
icy ends up constraining the teacher more than necessary or even if the
policy does not specifically prohibit the conduct in question.78
Marchi could even help decide cases in which the school did not
fashion a formal policy but merely took some action, such as suspending
a teacher, after receiving complaints. In that situation, Marchi's princi-
ple of breathing room offers strong support for the action.79 The school
can act preemptively - stopping borderline conduct even before it be-
comes a clear constitutional problem - "even though the conduct it for-
bids might not inevitably be determined to violate the Establishment
Clause." °80 Again, the school need only point to a reasonable fear of
litigation. 8t While an over-eager school might try to use this power as a
sword against teachers rather than as a shield to protect students, courts
would be unlikely to uphold policies in which the school's claim of liti-
gation fears was merely a pretext. Courts ably detect pretextual explana-
tions in other religious contexts,82 and thus this possible abuse does not
undermine Marchi's principle.
Of course, whether acting by policy or ad hoc, a school must be
mindful of the prevailing outer limits of the Establishment Clause. A
school still cannot take action to bar all religious references from the
classroom. History classes may study the Bible,8 3 and holiday celebra-
tions may include Christmas and Hanukkah displays.84 A lesson is not
improper simply because it happens to overlap with religious beliefs;
teaching that murder is morally wrong, for instance, is perfectly accept-
able.8 5 Were a school to heed such an over-zealous complaint, it could
be open to a suit by the teacher, alleging a violation of the Free Exercise
and Free Speech clauses.8 6 However, this subset of indisputably permit-
78 See id. at 477, 480. The Supreme Court has rejected any defense of religious intrusion
on the grounds that the invasion was small; as James Madison warned in 1785, "it is proper to
take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties." Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S 1, 65
app. (1947).
79 See Marchi, 173 F.3d at 476.
80 Id.
81 See supra Part II.A for discussion of Marchi's holding.
82 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987) (holding that in the
Lemon inquiry, a state's asserted "secular purpose" must be "sincere and not a sham").
83 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 300 (1963).
84 Sechler v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 121 F. Supp. 2d 439, 451, 453 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
85 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 612-13 (1988) (recognizing that on some "sen-
sitive and important" issues, "it is not surprising that the [g]overnment's secular concerns
would either coincide or conflict with those of religious institutions").
86 Cf Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (striking down state university's
policy excluding religious groups from open-forum policy, holding in part that Free Exercise
concerns may outweigh a state's interest in achieving a greater separation of church and state
than the Establishment Clause requires).
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ted (non-frivolous) religion in the public school classroom is small.
Most school policies to restrict religion ,will be upheld, if for no reason
other than that they clear the low hurdle of being "reasonably concerned"
about litigation. 87
Already, courts in the Second Circuit have used Marchi to uphold
school policies. Relying heavily on Marchi, a district court ruled that a
school acted lawfully in ordering a teacher to remove or cover a T-shirt
that read "Jesus 2000."188 That court specifically relied on the principles
of compelling state interest and giving the school administrators leeway
in drafting their response.89 The judge noted that the school's proscrip-
tion would stand even if the teacher's shirt were not an unconstitutional
religious intrusion, a clear indication that overbroad policies may be
valid nonetheless.90 Another court, upholding a school's policy of al-
lowing an Earth Day celebration, emphasized the school's duty to ensure
that its teachers do not inculcate religion.9' Marchi's approach also has
upheld state action in contexts beyond the classroom.92 These exten-
sions, where the rationale of special susceptibility does not apply,
demonstrate subsequent courts' acceptance of the remaining foundations
- the compelling state interest in avoiding Establishment Clause viola-
tions and the need to give government leeway in crafting religion poli-
cies for its employees.
This approach, now the law in the Second Circuit, is at the leading
edge of education and Establishment Clause jurisprudence nationwide.
However, it is an advance beyond the analysis elsewhere only in the
degree and forcefulness of its declaration. The Seventh Circuit relied on
the state's interest in upholding the removal of a substitute teacher who
offered to forgo assigning homework if the students would keep his Bi-
ble discussion a secret. 93 The Ninth Circuit recognized that a school's
interest in avoiding constitutional violations trumped a teacher's right to
discuss religion with his students.94 And the Tenth Circuit similarly
ruled that a school could prohibit a teacher from reading the Bible si-
lently during class. 95 These decisions acknowledge that full protection
for students under the Establishment Clause requires a strong approach,
87 See Marchi v. B.O.C.E.S., 173 F.3d 469, 477 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 869
(1999).
88 Downing v. W. Haven Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D. Conn. 2001).
89 Id. at 27-28.
90 Id. at 28 (citing Marchi, 173 F.3d at 476, for the need to give government "leeway").
91 Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 76-80 (2d Cir. 2001).
92 See Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2001) (up-
holding state's right to limit the religious speech of its employees - here, sign language
interpreters).
93 Helland v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 93 F.3d 327, 330-32 (7th Cir. 1996).
94 Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994).
95 Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1052-58 (10th Cir. 1990).
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one that recognizes the state's compelling interest and its leeway in
decisionmaking.
For many years, "Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been re-
markably consistent in sustaining virtually every challenge to govern-
ment-sponsored religious expression or involvement in the public
schools." 96 Marchi represents another step forward - its low fear-of-
litigation standard and permissible overbreadth combine to give schools
unprecedented authority to head off constitutional violations before they
occur.
III. THE GAP
A. THE MESS - Is LEMON COMING OR GOING?
While Marchi offers schools broad discretion, its central features -
the fear-of-litigation standard and permissible overbreadth - can oper-
ate only in the larger context of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence
centered on Lemon. Unfortunately, Lemon suffers from a lack of confi-
dence: While Supreme Court opinions continue to trot it out as the stan-
dard, the justices have suggested numerous alterations and new
emphases. In 2000, a plurality of the Court acknowledged that "Lemon
has been modified, that subsequent cases had 'pared' factors ... and that
certain other opinions no longer are good law."'97 The Court's decision
in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris98 in 2002, upholding certain voucher pro-
grams, did not even mention Lemon, although it did identify the central
question in Lemon's language - whether the program "has the forbid-
den 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion." 99 More straightfor-
wardly, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, dissented from the Court's denial of certiorari in Tangipahoa
Parish Board of Education v. Freiler'0° in 2000, seeking "to take the
opportunity to inter the Lemon test once and for all." 101 Despite their
efforts, the test lives on, at least for now.
96 Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 377 (6th Cir. 1999).
97 Sechler v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 121 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446 n.1 I (M.D. Pa. 2000)
(citing Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000)).
98 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
99 Id. at 648-49. However, Justice O'Connor - who has been notoriously flexible with
Lemon - wrote in her concurrence that the decision did not "signal a major departure from"
previous Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100 530 U.S. 1251 (2000).
101 Id. at 1253. As Justice Scalia once much more vividly put it:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school at-
torneys .... Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a
somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him.
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During the past decade of Establishment Clause cases, the Court has
both used a modified Lemon test and applied other tests in place of
Lemon. 10 2 Indeed, the Court "seems to support a practice of aggregating
or omitting certain tests depending on the facts of each case."103 Justice
O'Connor has attempted to justify this proliferation of paths, writing:
"[T]he same constitutional principle may operate very differently in dif-
ferent contexts. . . . Experience proves that the Establishment
Clause ... cannot easily be reduced to a single test. There are different
categories of Establishment Clause cases, which may call for different
approaches." 104 Two of these approaches have gained particular promi-
nence, often appearing as substitutes for the original Lemon method.
In 1984, Justice O'Connor developed a two-pronged test that found
state action to violate the Establishment Clause if it (1) is excessively
entangled with religion or (2) endorses or disapproves of religion. 05
The test considers the government's intent, and the answer may depend
on "judicial interpretation of social facts."' 1 6 The Court soon used
O'Connor's endorsement test as part of its Lemon analysis for govern-
ment displays of religious objects. 10 7 By then, however, Justice Kennedy
had suggested a new two-part test for coercion: The government must
neither (1) coerce participation in religion nor (2) directly benefit relig-
ion. 10 8 By 1992, the Court was using Kennedy's approach to analyze
prayer at graduation ceremonies. 10 9 That test, too, became a frequent
(and frequently criticized)'' ° member of the Court's Establishment
Clause methodology.
This longstanding reluctance to either strictly apply Lemon or ex-
pressly overrule it has left lower courts in a state of "confusion."'"I l Thus
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
102 Jon Veen, Note, Where Do We Go From Here? The Need for Consistent Establish-
ment Clause Jurisprudence, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1195, 1195 (2000) (citing Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997), as an example of a modified Lemon and Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000), as an example of using the coercion test instead).
103 Andrea Ahlskog Mittleider, Case Note, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Educa-
tion: Ignoring the Flaws in the Establishment Clause, 46 Loy. L. REV. 467, 482 (2000).
104 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see also Penny J. Meyers, Note, Lemon Is Alive and Kicking: Using the Lemon
Test To Determine the Constitutionality of Prayer at High School Graduation Ceremonies, 34
VAL. U. L. REV. 231, 254 (1999).
105 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106 Id. at 694.
107 County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989).
108 Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-98 (1992).
110 See Veen, supra note 102, at 1219.
M'' Allen M. Brabender, Case Comment, The Movement Towards Neutrality as the Single
Criteria [sic] for Determining the Constitutionality of School Aid Under the Establishment
Clause: Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 77 N.D. L. REV. 97, 107 (2001). See, e.g., Warner
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today, while a court must acknowledge that Lemon remains binding pre-
cedent, the neat center of that test paints only part of the picture. Add-
ons such as O'Connor's and Kennedy's emphases may play a role, and
critics of Lemon - both on the Court and in academia - continually
offer substitutes." 12 Until the Supreme Court hands down a ringing en-
dorsement of Lemon in some form, 1 3 eliminating the currents of discon-
tent, Establishment Clause jurisprudence will continue to unfold under a
cloud of uncertainty. And as Marchi demonstrates, that uncertainty can
prove a serious impediment to meaningful protection of religious
freedom.
B. LEMON'S ROLE IN SCHOOL POLICYMAKING
Marchi lets a school act whenever it fears non-frivolous litigation,
but it does not answer the question of what challenges are frivolous. And
although courts will allow some overbreadth, they surely will not grant
schools free rein to make policies without regard to the values served by
the Constitution in its entirety, a balance that implicates free speech and
free exercise as well as establishment. 14 Therefore, Marchi remains
vulnerable to shifts in the floor below it, and the current uncertainty in
that floor - exhibited in the less-than-enthusiastic support for Lemon -
threatens to undermine the Second Circuit's strides.
1. Frivolousness and the Risk of Litigation
As Judge Newman stated in Marchi, school authorities need only a
reasonable concern of "non-frivolous Establishment Clause challenges"
in order to sustain a policy prohibiting religious activity. 15 In the cur-
rent state of fluidity, with Lemon "clarifications" emerging every few
years and the applicable test a fresh question for each case, 1 6 very few
challenges may be so outlandish as to be "frivolous." For example, a
parent may complain that a teacher uses Bible passages as reading com-
prehension exercises. Is that claim frivolous? Marchi can only point the
analysis toward Lemon. And under Lemon as it stands, this is a close
v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 827 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("we are wary
of relying upon Lemon");
112 See, e.g., Hugh Baxter, Managing Legal Change: The Transformation of Establish-
ment Clause Law, 46 UCLA L. REV. 343, 382-91, 440-57 (1998).
1 13 For example, while the Court stated that it was applying Lemon in Santa Fe Indepen-
dent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314 (2000), it did not take the opportunity to sweep
away the rumors of Lemon's demise that litter the periphery and lower courts.
114 See Wheeler, supra note 23, at 581.
115 Marchi v. B.O.C.E.S., 173 F.3d 469, 477 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 869 (1999).
116 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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case; 117 the challenge, then, is likely not frivolous, and the school could
proscribe such conduct.
But tweak Lemon and the result becomes less obvious. Under a test
for endorsement, such as O'Connor's, the claim is far less likely to suc-
ceed." i8 To some courts, it may indeed be frivolous to demand a policy
prohibiting this activity, and a school that implemented such a policy
could find itself in court on the other side - facing a suit by angry
parents or teachers asserting that the rule infringed their First Amend-
ment rights. Marchi could not save this situation, despite the Second
Circuit's commitment to a broad grant of school authority. And given
the Supreme Court's unwillingness to shore up an Establishment Clause
test, it is no great leap to envision the shift in results described above;
indeed, O'Connor's endorsement test has decided several cases. 119
The significant consideration is not that the Supreme Court may or
may not introduce a new test for constitutional interpretation. Rather, it
is the uncertainty that will persist until the Court takes such a step or
disclaims any intention to do so. At first glance, this uncertainty may
appear to strengthen Marchi, for if the school cannot know in advance
what test will apply, then many more potential challenges will be non-
frivolous. But upon consideration of a school's likely response to these
court challenges, this uncertainty likely will produce the opposite effect
and weaken Marchi.
Although Marchi could ultimately vindicate a school's action by
finding that the specter of litigation was real enough, in many cases this
will occur only after there actually is litigation. As Marchi's own facts
show, the school successfully defended its responses to the teacher's re-
ligious activity. 120 But this victory came at the cost of enduring five
years of the teacher's lawsuit. 12 1 Marchi gives schools a powerful trump
117 Applying the Lemon factors: (1) the exercise does have a secular purpose (teaching
reading comprehension); (2) its primary effect might advance religion (a fact-sensitive in-
quiry); and (3) it might foster excessive government entanglement with religion (again, fact-
sensitive). See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
118 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
While there may be some "entanglement," judges likely would find it less than "excessive,"
and any "endorsement" of religion is of a subtlety likely to escape judicial analysis in such a
religious environment as contemporary American society.
119 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573 (1989). And as O'Connor
has suggested, different tests may apply in different situations. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 718,
720 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120 Marchi, 173 F.3d at 480.
121 Indeed, B.O.C.E.S. endured a legal "saga" with Dan Marchi that lasted from his first
suspension in 1994 until the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari late in 1999. See Rick Kar-
lin, High Court Refuses to Hear Teacher's Appeal, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 5, 1999,
at B I.
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card, but the ante of years' worth of litigation may be so high that it
never gets played.1 22
The cost of litigation - even litigation that a party is likely to win
- can be great enough to change that party's behavior enough to avoid
the litigation in the first place.' 23 As a result, schools may shy away
from confronting teachers and parents over strong religious policies, for
government limits on religion are generally unpopular. 124 The Establish-
ment Clause exists to protect the minority from excessive intrusions, but
it is this minority status that likely will make up school administrators'
minds. Weaker policies invite complaints from students who find their
Establishment Clause rights threatened, but these students will be fewer
in number than those lining up to sue over a policy they feel is too
strong. A litigation-averse school will look at the numbers and make a
quick decision to take its chances with the smaller class of plaintiffs.
The basis behind this seemingly counterintuitive result - that even
though fewer lawsuits will be frivolous, schools will adopt weaker poli-
cies - is the ability of American spirituality to stare down the Constitu-
tion. The fact remains that religious sentiment runs strong in the United
States - often surging even higher during periods of increased self-re-
flection 125 - and this holds true in schools as much as in other con-
122 Challengers to such policies are more likely to be well-funded and willing to wait out
protracted litigation. In recent years, for example, the Rutherford Institute bankrolled an un-
successful two-year challenge to Columbine High School's decision not to allow religious
symbols in its memorial project. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (10th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 893 (2003); Owen S. Good, Court Rejects Columbine Suit,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Jan. 14, 2003, at 4A. The group also funded the success-
ful appeal in which the Supreme Court ruled that schools must grant religious groups the same
after-school access to public facilities as other groups. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.,
533 U.S. 98 (2001); David G. Savage, Justices Allow Church Club to Meet in School, L.A.
TIMES, June 12, 2001, at Al. Two other similar entities, the American Center for Law and
Justice and the Center for Individual Rights, led the successful effort to force a university to
give student activity funds to a religious newspaper, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Laurie Goodstein & Joan Biskupic, In Two Rulings, High Court
Redifines Relationship Between Church, State, WASH. POST, June 30, 1995, at Al.
123 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of
Litigation Behavior, 1999 ILL. L. REV. 43, 53 (recognizing the economic theory of cost-benefit
analysis). Even behavioral critics agree that potential litigants choose strategies to achieve the
best possible outcome. See id.; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of
Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 113, 118 (1996).
124 For example, consider the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, passed "to overturn an
unpopular decision of the Court that Congress perceived as limiting the protection afforded
religious exercise." Laura S. Nelson, Remove Not the Ancient Landmark: Legal Protection for
Historic Religious Properties in an Age of Religious Freedom Legislation, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 721, 731 (1999). The Court, in turn, invalidated the act. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997). In the education context, a 1999 poll revealed that "Ameri-
cans ... overwhelmingly believe the government should allow prayer in the school." Albert
R. Hunt, Americans Decry Moral Decline, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1999, at A9.
125 For instance, witness the dramatic surge in public religion after Sept. 11, 2001. See,
e.g., George H. Smith, Atheists Tune in "God Bless America," NEWSDAY, Oct. 30, 2001, at
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texts. 126 Schools likely will find it difficult to enact unpopular policies
that benefit small minorities, the Constitution notwithstanding. While
the character of that minority may vary from place to place, public relig-
ion is necessarily an intrusion upon some members of a heterogeneous
society. The Marchi facts present an easier case, but in more borderline
situations, a school may choose to side with the voting majority and take
its chances in court against the Establishment Clause challenge of a mi-
nority. 127 Therefore, while continued uncertainty might allow a school
to go to greater lengths in setting religion policies, that same uncertainty
makes it less likely that the school actually will do so. School officials
are unlikely to push the envelope in the face of popular opposition, and
only upon a clear signal from the Supreme Court of where those bounda-
ries lie will they feel comfortable taking countermajoritarian actions to
the extent that Marchi permits.
Until that clarification, however, and with the Establishment
Clause's lower limit a floating target, schools will cling to the lowest
common denominator from the prevailing tests. While policies and re-
sponses theoretically could be stronger, administrators will aim lower to
minimize unpopularity as well as litigation costs. Under this scenario,
Marchi quickly loses its force as a prospective deterrent on improper
religious intrusion by teachers and is left merely to vindicate the school
after a long and costly lawsuit. Unwilling to endure that cost just to take
the chance that an Establishment Clause claim will survive the Lemon
test du jour, schools will follow the majority and skimp on religious
protection.
2. Overbreadth and Imprecision
Marchi's other foundation - its tolerance of overbreadth and im-
precision - also suffers at the hands of Supreme Court indecision.
Overbreadth is inescapably a function of the underlying constitutional
interpretation that shapes its breadth. Here, uncertainty about how far or
how consistently the Supreme Court will apply Establishment Clause
protections makes Marchi a poor expression of school authority. A lib-
eral Lemon test - seeing religion-advancing primary effects and exces-
sive entanglement in a wider range of state action - already provides
A43 (describing "the recent proliferation of 'God Bless America' signs" and concluding that
even Smith, a renowned atheist writer, would view this response positively).
126 See Charles Lane, Calif. School's Sign Runs Afoul of ACLU: Group Finds "God Bless
America" Message "Divisive," Demands Its Removal, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2001, at A6.
127 See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 996
(2001) (upholding state law requiring a minute of silence at the start of every school day). In
Brown, the state prevailed in the face of directly adverse Supreme Court precedent, Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), by persuading the court to limit the previous ruling to its facts and
adopt a strained interpretation of mixed motives. See Brown, 258 F.3d at 279-81.
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the school great latitude in prohibiting impermissible activity. Marchi's
dictate that the school can bar more conduct than it foresees 28 then
brings an even greater amount of in-class activity within the purview of
acceptable policy. By contrast, a more restrictive Establishment Clause
analysis, such as Justice Kennedy's coercion test, 129 narrows religion
policy's breadth - and overbreadth.
The relevant thread is that the poles of Establishment Clause juris-
prudence lie far enough apart that setting a course for one will lead a
school significantly astray from the other. When a policymaker cannot
tell in advance which test will prevail, it constrains the resulting policy to
the lowest common denominator of Supreme Court pronouncements, and
if the action in question exceeds that policy yet otherwise falls even in
the middle of other situations, justification for that policy may have to
rely on a great deal of overbreadth. And while Marchi certainly deems a
certain degree of overbreadth acceptable, some constraint must exist, for
otherwise the overbreadth would swallow the limits. Only a certain
foundation - knowing which Establishment Clause approach will apply
- permits schools to set effective policies and allows courts to ensure
protective results.
C. MARCHI IN A WORLD OF CERTAINTY
Filling the gaps in Marchi's message will require a settled, predict-
able basis of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Given the existing
"confusion" among lower courts, 130 this statement of certainty must
come from the Supreme Court. Whether a commitment to Lemon, a
clear emphasis on one of its derivatives, or a new approach entirely, this
clarification will empower Marchi more by its presence than its actual
content. A stable Establishment Clause jurisprudence would shift the
balance of litigation risks in favor of schools that protect students from
religious intrustion.
A protective standard will deter more free-exercise complaints by
parents and teachers, and schools will be more likely to adopt policies
that track the standard. Such a stronger test, one that finds Establishment
128 Marchi v. B.O.C.E.S., 173 F.3d 469, 480 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 869 (1999);
see also Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993).
129 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-88 (1992) (discounting concerns about divi-
siveness, holding that "neither its existence nor its potential necessarily invalidates the [sitate's
attempts to accommodate religion"). Although Kennedy acknowledged that divisiveness
would be relevant to such an "overt religious exercise in a secondary school" as prayer at
graduation, his approach still leaves a high hurdle to clear in future claims of divisiveness in
which the religion is less "overt." See also Charles J. Russo, Prayer at Public School Gradua-
tion Ceremonies: An Exercise in Futility or a Teachable Moment?, 1999 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J.
1, 14 (recognizing that Kennedy's analysis in Lee v. Weisman paid little attention to divisive-
ness in voicing only "apparently unfounded concern" about this element of coercion).
130 Brabender, supra note I l, at 107.
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Clause violations more readily, gives Marchi maximum potential: The
combination of few non-frivolous challenges and permissible over-
breadth that reaches much state conduct leaves schools with vast author-
ity to prevent and eliminate religious intrusion in their classrooms.13'
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has trav-
eled a twisted and still winding road. While broad principles against
state endorsement of religion remain constant, the contours of those val-
ues - and, more important, the method for discerning whether a particu-
lar activity runs astray of them - continues to be a shot in the dark. In
the midst of this uncertainty, the Second Circuit has offered a ringing
endorsement of public schools' authority to make policies and take ac-
tions to prevent constitutional violations in the classroom. 132 The court
ruled that schools could take otherwise drastic action (that is, trumping a
teacher's First Amendment and Free Exercise rights) once faced with a
non-frivolous threat of litigation. And that action could be overbroad
and imprecise, given the state's position of regulating its own employees.
Moreover, this approach is "especially appropriate in an areas such as
discipline of teachers," where the state's compelling interest and chil-
dren's special susceptibility to indoctrination converge. 133
Yet the Supreme Court's underlying inability to set a course and
stick to it threatens to leave Marchi a hollow promise. Either a stronger
or weaker Establishment Clause test would add weight behind Marchi's
broad goals; a clouded and unpredictable test does not. Full realization
of the Second Circuit's vision - in which schools enjoy maximum dis-
cretion in taking action to combat potential violations - will emerge
only with clarity. The bottom line is clear: Marchi represents a potential
windfall in the long-running effort to ensure that public schools do not
cross the line between church and state, but that victory can come only
after a clear sign emerges from the Supreme Court's clouded vision.
131 Even a weaker test would still yield the benefit of reducing schools' exposure to litiga-
tion. Of course, such a statement of the law - one that is less protective of children and more
tolerant of governmental ties to religion - offers such a gain only at the cost of possible
religious indoctrination and divisiveness. See supra Part I.B.
132 Marchi, 173 F.3d at 469.
133 Id. at 480 (quoting DiLeo v. Greenfield, 541 F.2d 949, 954 (2d Cir. 1976)).
